Introduction
In the decade since the onset of the …nancial crisis, the disappointing recovery has sparked renewed concern about the medium-run outlook for advanced economies. Rather than returning to the pre-crisis trend, output has continued to diverge from it. It is di¢ cult to know whether this is a cyclical phenomenon, a slow recovery towards steady state, or a secular change in the nature of steady state growth. As Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) emphasise, major …nancial crises can have long-lasting e¤ects, and this makes it di¢ cult to distinguish what is cyclical from what is secular. As an indication of the di¢ culty of separating low frequency signals from high frequency noise, the Great Moderation, the marked reduction in the variance of the US macroeconomy after 1984, was not recognised as a sustained change until the late 1990s.
This was also an issue after the Great Depression. Hansen (1939) writing a decade after the Wall Street Crash, now sounds very topical with his concerns about the e¤ects of demographic and technological change, the topics we will be concerned with in this paper. Hansen warned of the danger of secular stagnation driven by declining population growth, which would remove the incentive to invest, though he did not anticipate the o¤setting e¤ects of the subsequent war and the baby boom. He also criticised those who regarded the advance of technology as a major cause of unemployment, arguing that there was a need for an accceleration of the rate of progress in science and technology.
Echoing Hansen, after the last …nancial crisis Summers (2015) , in a speech given in 2013, also warned of the dangers of secular stagnation. He noted the long term decline in real interest rates, and raised the concern that the equlibrium real rate may now have become negative and that a zero nominal rate would then become a chronic and systemic inhibitor of economic activity holding economies back below their potential.
While there may be an important, but transitory, cyclical component in the poor performance of the last decade, we will emphasise the secular forces likely to shape medium run macro-economic developments. We …rst review the impact of demographic structure and innovation, then we draw of the empirical and theoretical work reported in Aksoy, Basso, Smith and Grasl (2015) , ABSG, about the impact of changes in demographic structure on macroeconomic outcomes. This suggests that changes in age pro…le not only have signi…cant implications for savings, investment, real interest rates and growth but also for innovation and that the population aging predicted for the next decades will tend to reduce output growth and real interest rates across OECD countries.
The age structure of the population can be measured quite precisely and since it is largely predetermined by past fertility it can be forecast rather better than many other economic variables. But for other variables there are important measurement issues. Innovation is inherently di¢ cult to measure and the process by which technological change transmits to productivity can be quite opaque. There is the further concern that the mismeasurement of GDP and productivity is causing us to misinterpret the secular trends. While some like Feldstein (2017) have argued that the real growth in GDP and productivity have been underestimated, the consensus seems to be that mismeasurement is not enough to explain the lower productivity growth and that in the US the break in trend pre-dates the crisis..
Demography, innovation and the macroeconomy
Hansen's demographic concern was falling population growth rates, the current concern is with an aging population. As is now well known, age pro…les in OECD economies are signi…cantly changing. Figure 1 shows the average of UN Population Division estimates of shares of each age group over 21 OECD countries. In this sample, the average proportion of the population aged 60+ increased almost linearly from 16% in 1970 and is projected to reach 29% in 2030, with most of the corresponding decline experienced in the 0-19 age group. Figure 2 shows the shares for the UK. The UN expects an inversion of the 'population pyramid'by 2030 with far reaching economic (and potentially social) consequences. The baby-boom generation born between the end of World War II and the late 1960's was very large, re ‡ecting high fertility. They started to enter the labour force between the mid 60's and early 80's. Subsequently fertility rates fell and hence the share of the youngest group (aged 0-9) of the OECD societies fell from almost 20% in the 1970s, to almost 10% predicted for 2030. While fertility declined, longevity increased in response to improved economic conditions, widespread welfare systems and medical advances among others factors. This increase in longevity and the increasing share of the aged in society has implications for expenditure on health and social care, though responsibility for that expenditure di¤ers across countries. While there is an overall aging trend across the OECD sample, there is substantial cross country variation. Population aging in Japan is most pronounced followed by France, the UK and the US. There is considerable cross sectional heterogeneity since countries began aging at di¤erent times In addition to fertility and longevity the other main in ‡uence on the age pro…le is immigration or emigration; migrants tend to be young. In addition the economic e¤ect of the age pro…le is in ‡uenced by participation rates, which di¤er substantially across countries depending on the prevalence and length of higher education; the incentives and disincentives for women to participate in the labour force; and the factors that in ‡uence retirement age and the employment of the old.
As in Hansen's day there is concern both about the speed of technological change and its employment consequences. There is the concern that driverless cars and computers that can defeat Go Champions threaten jobs. With rapid improvements in computer power, it is feared that there will come a point, labelled "The Singularity", where humans become economically super‡uous in the sense that they make no di¤erence to economic performance. Echoing Hansen's scepticism about the negative employment consequences of technological change, Nordhaus (2015) argues that the key question is the substitutability between information and conventional inputs and there is little evidence for a high degree of substitution.
While some fear accelerating technological change leading to the singularity others fear declining rates of innovation and the repeal of Moore's Law which has driven the improvement of electronic components. Gordon (2015) argues that technological change may have slowed and a decline in fundamental inventions may reduce growth. As we noted above, measuring the rate of innovation is inherently di¢ cult, and relating it to measured productivity growth even more di¢ cult.
There is a well established link of innovation to demography. Kuznets (1960) argued "It is the younger groups in the labour force who are most mobilein space and within the productive system-since unlike older workers they are not committed to family and housing or to established positions. This greater mobility is particularly true of new entrants into the labour force, who naturally veer toward those sectors that are likely to spearhead the country's economic growth and who are oriented toward these sectors even in their training within the educational system." Similarly, Jones (2010) presents microeconomic evidence that there is a link between great ideas and the age of the genius. He examines the distribution of Nobel-worthy ideas and great inventions and their association with the age pro…le of their inventors. Irmen and Litina (2016) …nd a hump shaped e¤ect of aging on inventive activity. The increasing part captures the recognition that aging requires inventive activity to guarantee current and future standards of living. The decreasing part re ‡ects the tendency of aging societies to lose dynamism and the willingness to take risks.
While most see population aging as having a negative e¤ect on growth, Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) argue that, in cross-section, countries where the ratio of old to young workers has increased have grown faster, not slower, than other countries. They argue that this is because technology adjusts to o¤set the negative e¤ects of aging, by the substitution of robots and other forms of automation for the workers in short supply. The time-series e¤ects of aging populations in countries like Japan do not seem so positive, but some have argued that special factors are at work there.
The cause of the secular fall in the real interest rate over the last 35 years, that Summers noted, is a matter of dispute, particularly when the share of profits is tending to increase. Favero et al. (2016) relate the common persistent component of the US term structure of interest rates to the age composition of the population. One piece of the puzzle is how to interpret the e¤ect of the demographic trends on real interest rates. This is not straightforward. On the demand side, older people tend to dissave, putting upward pressure on the interest rate; while younger people, expecting to live longer, save more, putting downward pressure on interest rates. But on the supply side, the e¤ects are reversed. The innovative tendencies of the young tend to raise the marginal product of capital and the real interest rate. This e¤ect was observed with the entry of the baby boom generation into the workforce. Correspondingly as the population ages the adoption of new ideas slows and the marginal product of capital declines. If the decline in the real interest rate was driven by demand side e¤ects, one might expect this to cause investment to increase. But investment has not been increasing, consistent with the driving force being a supply side e¤ect causing a fall in the marginal product of capital. If the supply side channel dominates one would expect an ageing population to be associated with declining innovation; a falling marginal product of capital and lower real interest rates, lower investment and lower growth.
In a contrary view, Goodhart et al. (2015) argue that the historical combination of the decline in real interest rates, the decline in real wages in the advanced economies and rising inequality have been driven by positive labour supply shocks and that the rising share of the old will cause savings to fall more than investment, thus leading to a rise in real interest rates.
Estimates of Demographic e¤ects
In this section we summarise the empirical evidence, reported in ABSG, about the impact of changes in demographic structure on macroeconomic outcomes. As Kuznets (1960) pointed out, the aggregate population of a society serves as producer, saver and consumer, but each age group contributes to the production, saving and consumption processes di¤erently. Thus the demographic structure may a¤ect the long and short-term macroeconomic conditions through several channels. Di¤erent age groups (i) have di¤erent savings behaviour, according to the life-cycle hypothesis; (ii) have di¤erent productivity levels, according to the age pro…le of wages; (iii) work di¤erent amounts, the very young and very old tend not to work, with implications for labour input; (iv) contribute di¤erently to the innovation process, with young and middle age workers contributing the most; and (v) provide di¤erent investment opportunities, as …rms target their di¤erent needs. Thus, changes in demographic structure can be expected to in ‡uence savings and investment, hours worked, real interest rates, in ‡ation and real output in the long and short-term either directly or via their e¤ects on expectations on the future course of key variables.
ABSG estimate a panel vector autoregression, VAR, using data for 20 OECD countries, over the period . The estimation period is deliberately ended at 2007 so that the predictions of the demographic e¤ects are not contaminated with the e¤ects of the crisis; the large drop in output occuring at the time the population is aging. This panel VAR is used to study how much of the variation in key macroeconomic variables can be explained by the evolution of the society's demographic structure, represented by the proportion of various age groups in total population. The six endogenous macro-economic variables, explained by the model, are the growth rate of the real GDP, g i;t ; the share of investment in GDP, I i;t ; the share of personal savings in GDP, S i;t ; the logarithm of hours worked per capita, H i;t ; the real short-term interest rate, R i;t , and the rate of in ‡ation, i;t : The exogenous variables, not explained by the model, are population growth, the oil price and the age structure. Population growth is included as a control to distinguish its e¤ects from the age structure e¤ects that are partly caused by population growth.
Demographic variables, like the age structure change slowly and follow a 'snake in the tunnel'pattern as large cohorts, like the baby boomers, age. This slow smooth pattern of demographic change makes it di¢ cult to separate its e¤ects from other slow moving trends. However, as the demographic structure of the countries in the sample changes at di¤erent times, the cross-section variability in the panel data can help to identify the e¤ect of these slow changes. The dynamic nature of the panel vector autoregression, VAR, allows estimation of the long-run e¤ects of the demographic movements, as they are transmitted through the whole system. This allows for the interaction between the six macro variables over time, while controlling for population growth and oil prices. The long-run e¤ect is obtained by assessing how the impact of changes in the age pro…le reverberate through the macroeconomy, as the six key variables interact. Table 1 reports the long-term demographic e¤ects for three distinct age groups ( 1 : 0-19 year olds; 2 : 20-59 and 3 : 60+). ABSG also reports results using a more granular demographic structure using eight age groups. The results are qualitatively similar. N o t e : = 10%; = 5% l e v e l s o f s i g n i … c a n c e . Table 1 . Long-Run Demographic Impact. ** 10%, * 5% level of sign…cance.
ABSG also estimate a system which includes the number of patent applications and con…rm, at the macroeconomic level, the age pattern that Jones (2010) identi…ed at the microeconomic level. The demographic structure also a¤ects innovation in a life-cycle pattern, with the proportion of prime-age workers (in particular 40-49 age group) having a strong positive impact on total number of patent applications. The proportion of young dependents and older generations have a negative impact on the number of patent applications per capita. Table 1 shows that the changing age pro…le across OECD countries has economically and statistically signi…cant impacts on these key macroeconomic variables and these e¤ects roughly re ‡ect a life-cycle pattern. A larger proportion of the young reduces hours worked and increases in ‡ation. A larger proportion of the working age increases growth, investment and savings, though the e¤ects are not signi…cant, increases hours worked and reduces in ‡ation. A larger proportion of the old reduces growth, investment savings and hours and increases in ‡ation. These are broadly the e¤ects that one would expect, what is particularly interersting is the demographic e¤ect on the real interest rate, where the demand and supply e¤ects worked in opposite directions. On the demand side older people tend to dissave, putting upward pressure on the interest rate, while young workers expecting to live longer save more, putting downward pressure on interest rates. While on the supply side, innovation by the young workers raises the marginal product of capital and the real interest rate, while the old inhibiting the adoption of new ideas depress the marginal product of capital and the real interest rate. The estimates support a supply side interpretation with the proportion of dependent young and the old depressing real interest rates and the proportion of workers increasing them.
The estimates from the model with eight age groups are used to investigate the impact of the baby-boomers entering the labour market in 1970's and approaching retirement in late 2000's for the individual countries in the sample. For the in-sample period of 2000-2007 changes in the age pro…le contributed to a signi…cant reduction in hours worked, with Japan being the country most signi…cantly a¤ected. Using the United Nations population predictions an outof-sample exercise is performed to gauge how future demographic changes may impact output growth and real rates until 2030. In most countries the decrease in working-age population and fertility and the increase in the proportion of retirees expected for the next 20 years would result in a strong decrease in trend output growth and signi…cantly lower the real interest rate.
The United Nations (UN) population predictions and the long-run estimates are used to perform country-speci…c prediction exercises. Since demographic trends are largely predetermined by past birth rates and slowly changing longevity trends, one can predict age structure more precisely than many other variables. Table 2 shows the contribution of demographic changes to output growth for all countries in our sample. It compares the in sample period, the last decade 2000-2009 with the current decade 2010-19 (based on population predictions). For all countries in this sample the changes in age pro…le will lead to a statistically and economically signi…cant drop in trend growth. The average annual real output growth is expected to be reduced by 0.99 percentage points in Japan, 0.92 in the U.S., and 0.77 in Switzerland and 0.40 in the UK. The table also gives the probability of an increase in the growth rate which is very small. 2000-2009 2010-2019 Similarly over the longer period from 2000 until 2030, using the UN demographic projections, the expected decrease in the proportion of the population of working-age and the increase in the proportion of retirees cause both output growth and the real interest rate to decline. For many countries the predicted real interest rate is negative, supporting Summers concerns.
Demographics and Innovation, Production and
Medium-run Economic Performance ABSG also develop a theoretical model to match the life cycle characteristics observed empirically and to study the main mechanisms through which demographic changes a¤ect the macroeconomy. The key elements of the model can be summarised as follows. The economic environment incorporates (i) life cycle properties with three generations of the population (dependant young, workers and retirees) and introduce investment in human capital and (ii) endogenous productivity and medium-term dynamics as in Comin and Gertler (2006) and thus can study the long-term interaction of demographic changes with savings, investment and innovation decisions. A change in the age pro…le a¤ects the macroeconomy through three distinct channels. Firstly, changes in fertility and availability of resources of workers a¤ect investment in human capital and the labour supply. Secondly, aging a¤ects the saving decision of workers. Finally, the share of young workers impacts the innovation process positively and, as a result, a change in the demographic pro…le that skews the distribution of the population to the right, leads to a decline in innovation activity. The link between demographics and innovation is crucial in matching our empirical …nd-ings.
Using calibrated values of the parameters, model simulations show that an increase in the share of young dependants and retirees decreases output growth and investment while an increase in the share of working age does the opposite. In addition, a permanent increase in longevity (an increase in life expectancy) leads to increased growth rates in the short-term as the decrease in the marginal propensity to consume of workers leads to lower real interest rate and an increase in innovative activity. However, as the share of young workers decrease, productivity in innovation decreases leading to permanently lower output growth and investment. Finally, the UN population predictions are fed into the theoretical model and the expected changes in population dynamics, for di¤erent countries in our samples, match the predictions of the empirical model. Although the theoretical model only incorporates three age groups (relative to the eight groups in the empirical model) it does well in capturing the estimated impact of changes in demographic structure on output growth and real interest rates for di¤erent countries. Increases in average age and reduced fertility are found to be a strong force reducing output growth and real rates across OECD countries.
Of course, demographics are not destiny and our conclusions assume that there will not be major changes in rates of immigration, labour force participation, fertility or longevity. In addition our argument depends on two interesting linkages, that deserve further study: the demographic e¤ects on Innovation and technological change and the demographic e¤ects on real interest rates.
